By Dr. Jarrett Leplin (auth.)
This publication proposes an unique thought of epistemic justification that gives a brand new approach to relate justification to the epistemic aim of truth-conducive trust. the speculation relies on a unique research of trustworthy belief-formation that solutions vintage objections to reliability theories in epistemology. The research generates a manner of distinguishing justified trust from believing justifiedly, such that inerrant belief-formation needn't be justificatory while systemic deception should be. It thereby respects the instinct that criteria for justification has to be obtainable to the believer, whereas retaining the fundamental connection of justification to truth.
The research indicates how justification pertains to, yet is special from, facts, rationality, and chance. It offers a unifying therapy of concerns critical to present debate in epistemology, together with epistemic paradoxes, epistemic closure, skepticism, contextualism, advantage theories, the impression of success on wisdom and justification, the translation of subjunctive stipulations for justification, the clash among internalism and externalism, and metaphilosophical review of epistemological theories. There are extra functions to metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of technological know-how, and ethics.
The e-book will have interaction philosophers operating in epistemology or comparable fields, and their graduate students.
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Additional info for A Theory of Epistemic Justification
12 Michael DePaul (2004), following Conee, seeks an intrinsic value for justification independent of its instrumental utility in directing our beliefs toward truth. DePaul does not consider the possibility that the independent value of justification is to serve the goal of monitoring our progress with respect to the goal of truth. 30 2 Truth-Conduciveness that the priority should go the other way. I suggest that being right has intrinsic value, and that the reason we value knowledge in addition to being right is that we want not just to advance the epistemic goal but also to ascertain this is what we are doing.
Second-order limitations will concern me later (primarily in Chapters 10 and 11). I think it suffices here to note that ordinary language exerts little pressure at that level. There is a further point. For every belief there is a believer, perhaps more than one. Suppose two subjects believe the same proposition, but form or sustain the belief differently; one truth-conducively, one not. The question of whether the belief itself is justified becomes ambiguous. We must be prepared to distinguish one’s belief from the other’s, although, as there is only one believed proposition, in a natural sense they have the same belief.
1 The Epistemic Goal 21 So what I wish to propose a theory of is that which advances an implicit preference for true belief. It is reasonable to ask why we should expect epistemic justification, so understood, to admit of theorizing. My assumption that justification advances the epistemic goal suggests the answer that the status of being epistemically justified has nonepistemic truth conditions. It is an empirical matter what in fact advances the epistemic goal. A correct theory about this would, according to the assumption, tell us what is epistemically justificatory.