By Jerrold J Katz
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Extra resources for Analyticity, Necessity, and the Epistemology of Semantics
S. Hacker point out (1984b, 109), this was a view that Wittgenstein rejected. Consider pain. In the sense of «internal relation" that we are considering, there is an internal relation between the concept of pain and instances of pain behavior (that's why it's pain behavior), despite the fact that a person in pain can sometimes suppress pain behavior and a person can feign pain by producing instances of pain behavior in the absence of pain. It would be wrong to say that a person is in pain if and only if she displays some «characteristic expression-behavior" Internal Relations 43 (Wittgenstein 1981, §488) of pain, and it would be wrong to hold this proposition to be not merely true, but analytic.
39 If inner experience is the sort of thing that admits of a unified explanation, then what grounds are there for saying that the skeptical hypothesis is too implausible to take seriously? It is, after all, the only challenger to the "folk theory of the external world"; so there is no question of having to seek out and test a potential infinity of rival explanations. A naturalistic view of hypothesis testing would seem to require that the skeptic's hypothesis be taken very seriously here. Notice that some other standard naturalistic ploys are of no help here.
It seems more like what Nagel calls a "heroic" attempt to "leap across the gap" (69) that the metaphysical realist purports to discern between mind and world, while "The chasm below;' as Nagel observes, "is littered with epistemological corpses" (69). Unfortunately, such heroic wizardry seems to be just what the strong objectivist needs at this point. The metaphysical realist wants to express a possibility that in principle cannot be expressed, to say knowingly from within the vat, as it were, that we might really always have been brains in a vat.